In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 2000) could have been characterized by direct mechanisms even if the Revelation Principle does not apply in their setting. The use of more sophisticated mechanisms, such as menus, was not necessary.
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Introduction
Biais et al. [3] (BMR thereafter) consider a multi-principals game to analyze imperfect competition under adverse selection in financial markets. Strategic liquidity suppliers post nonlinear prices (such as limit order schedules) which stand ready to trade with a risk-adverse agent who has private information on the fundamental value of the asset as well as on his hedging needs. BMR show that there exists an unique equilibrium in convex schedules and they analyze its properties. In order to do that, they do not use standard mechanism design methods.
Usually, in principal-agents games direct mechanisms are sufficient to characterize all equilibria. Peters [10] and Martimort & Stole [5] have shown that restricting the attention to direct mechanisms may induce a loss of generality. Some equilibria cannot be characterize by direct mechanisms. Nevertheless, if we consider more general mechanisms, such as menus (or price schedules), one can characterize all equilibria of every common agency game. The drawback of this approach is that menus (or price schedules) are more difficult to handle than direct mechanisms.BMR show that using calculus of variations one can characterize equilibria even if we allow principals to use menus. From that point of view BMR is an interesting contribution to the literature as it provides a clear and rigorous methodology. 1 Following Peters [11] , we know that there are potentially two kind of equilibria in a common agency game. We may have equilibria that can be characterized by direct mechanisms and equilibria that can be characterized by menus only. Another methodology would have been to consider only direct mechanisms. If by doing that one cannot characterize all equilibria, Peters [11] has shown that one characterizes regular equilibria, i.e; equilibria which are robust to the introduction of more sophisticated communication schemes.
In this note, we show that the BMR equilibrium could have been characterized by a much simpler approach: namely the restriction to direct mechanisms. This result is not trivial. As we have said, it is has been shown, by the use of examples 2 that direct mechanisms are not sufficient to characterize every equilibria of that class of games.
1
On the other hand, it exist assumptions (roughly speaking separability conditions) under which a common agency game has only equilibria that can be characterized by direct mechanisms. 3 These conditions are not satisfied by the BMR's model. Thus, one could have expected that the equilibrium derived by BMR could not be characterized by direct mechanisms. It is not the case.
This suggests to indicate that we can use simpler or more traditional methodologies in common agency games. BMR's model is a good example of such games. The framework is simple but general enough to get interesting results and testable implication. However, our result is not general at all and we have to be very prudent in our conclusions.
The Model
We use exactly the BMR's model. We just briefly present the formal aspects, for a more complete description of the model and its properties please refer to the original article.
There are (n + 1) players in the game, n principals and one agent. The principals play first, they offer simultaneously "mechanisms". A "mechanism" is a mapping from a message space (M i is the set of all possible message spaces for principal i, i ∈ {1, . . ., n}) to the decision space. Here a principal takes two decisions, a price T and a quantity q, the decision space is Ê 2 . Principal i offers a couple (M i , (T i (.) , q i (.))). The agent can either reject or accept the offer. If he accepts then he sends the message m ∈ M i (we must have M i ∈ M i ), the agent gets from principal i the decision (T i (m) , q i (m)).
In the BMR model the interpretation of (T i (m) , q i (m)) is the following: the agent must trade the quantity q i (m) at the price T i (m). If the agent rejects the offer from principal i, he gets (0, 0) from him. The agent observes all the offered mechanisms and he decides to reject or accept some of them. His preferences are represented by the following utility function.
3 see Attar et al. [1] .
2
The variables γ and σ are common knowledge. The variable θ is known only by the agent, principals know only the distribution of that variable over the range of possible values Θ = θ, θ . The density function is denoted f . This density function is common knowledge.
The principal i's preferences over q i and T i are represented by the following utility function:
We consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for that game. The problem is quite complex, the set M i can be very large (it formalizes all possible communication schemes between a principal and the agent), and it is difficult to characterize the optimal choice of M i .
In a simple principal-agent game (n = 1), the so-called "Revelation Principle" (Myerson [7, 8] ) states that one can ignore the choice of M i , and consider that the message space is given and equal to Θ. One can show that the unique principal would have chosen (Θ, (T * (.) , q * (.))) even if he would not have been constrained to play
An immediate consequence of the revelation principle is that we can restrict our attention to direct "revealing" mechanisms. The direct mechanism (T * (.) , q * (.)) is "revealing" if it is such that the agent reveals the actual value of θ. Considering only "direct revealing mechanisms" simplifies a lot the game and the optimal values of T * (.) and q * (.) can be then characterized in most of the relevant games.
In contrast in multi-principals game (n > 1), the revelation principle does not apply: one cannot impose M i = Θ and characterize all equilibria of the game. If we do this we characterize only a subset of the equilibria of the game. 4 If we want to characterize all the equilibria of the game, we can only consider as possible message space all the subset of the decision space, and consider that implement the message receive from the agent (Peters [10] and Martimort & Stole [5] call this methodology "the Delegation Principle". In our particular game, rather than considering any element of the abstract set M , we can consider only the subsets of Ê 2 and the mapping (T i (.) , q i (.)) are define by:
where Z i ⊂ Ê 2 . Roughly speaking, the agent gets what he asks from any principal, but he is allow to choose only in a restricted set. These mechanisms are called "menus", or sometimes "catalogs".
Even if this result restricts the possible strategies, it does not simplify a lot the analysis given that we still have problem with the characterization (considering all subsets of Ê 2 is out of reach). BMR restrict the communication set by considering only a particular class of subset of Ê 2 : they consider that principals are only allow to choose continuous and (almost everywhere) differentiable menus. The message space is Q ⊂ Ê, a particular message is q ∈ Q, and if the agent sends the messageq, he gets (T (q) ,q), where T (.) is a continuous function, with a finite number of non-differentiable points.
In the following section we will show that the BMR equilibrium could be attained also using simple direct revealing mechanisms. 5 
Direct mechanisms equilibria
Principals are using direct mechanisms i.e; mappings (q i (.) , T i (.)) from Θ to Ê 2 . If the agent θ reports the vectorθ = θ 1 , . . . ,θ n ∈ Θ n , that is if reportsθ i to principal i, he gets
We focus on principal i (the index −i represents all other principals). He considers others principals' strategies q j (.) , T j (.) j =i as as given.
In order to clarify the exposition, let us introduce few more notations.
We denote byθ −i , withθ −i = θ 1 , . . . ,θ i−1 ,θ i+1 , . . .,θ n , the set of reports sent by the agent to the other principals. We define the best reportsθ −i , given the type (which is θ) of the agent and his report to principal i, taken as given and denotedθ i .
The reportsθ * −i are chosen optimally and they are functions of θ andθ i . If the solution is interior, it satisfies:
which can also by written
Now, we derive the optimal strategy of the principal i. As we apply the Revelation Principle, we assume the principal i offers incentive compatible mechanisms. In other words principal i offers maps T i (.), q(.) such that the agent reports to him his true type θ, given the mechanisms offered by the other principals.
The agent reports truthfully his type to principal i if
Applying the envelope theorem (i.e. using the fact that ∂θ * −i/∂θi = 0), we get an equivalent expression:
We now can define the rent obtained by the agent. The rent is the utility that the agent gets if his type is θ given the offers made by all principals
Applying again the envelope theorem, we get the derivative of U with respect to θ:
The agent's reports are characterized by first order conditions. This can be problematic if the function U θ θ is not concave. We need some assumptions ensuring that the matrix
is semi-definite negative. To get that, a necessary condition is
< 0 even if it is not sufficient to ensure that the former matrix is semi-definite negative. If messages are optimal whenθ i = θ and when for any j = i,θ j =θ * j , then the conditions ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
Using standard methods of mechanism design, 6 this last condition can also be written as
In words, he optimal quantity must be non decreasing with θ. This condition is standard in mechanism design theory. In a single principal setting, this latter condition and a restriction on the utility function, namely the Spence-Mirrlees condition, would ensure that our first order conditions are necessary and sufficient.
But these well known conditions are not sufficient when the number of principals is greater than one. To solve the main problem we will assume in the following that the 6 See for example Laffont & Tirole [4] .
6 second order conditions are always satisfied and we will check ex-post that it is the case at equilibrium.
If the function q i (.) is increasing, it obviously means that it can be first negative, then equal to zero and finally positive. We denote [θ, θ a ] the domain on which the function q i (.) is negative, [θ a , θ b ] on which q i (.) is constant and equal to zero and θ b , θ on which it is positive. Using these new notation, we can integrate the functionU to get a new expression of U .
if θ < θ a , and
Note that the function q (θ) must be continuous around θ a and θ b . Otherwise, by applying a simple argument, it would be possible for the principal to improve his profit: when θ ∈ [θ a , θ b ], q (θ) = 0, and the marginal profit for the principal i is equal to zero. If q (θ) does not go to zero when θ goes to θ a (with θ > θ a ), then a small increase of θ a , would increase principal i's profit.
Moreover, if q i (θ) = 0, for some θ, then we must have T (θ) = 0.
Integrating by parts these expressions gives
The profit of principal i can be written as
7 by using the definition of the utility function we can rewrite the former expression as:
or
First, let us consider θ a and θ b , as given. The problem of the principal is equivalent to a point-wise maximization problem. The principal maximizes the following expression with respect to q (θ) if θ ∈ θ b , θ . 7
(21) 7 As we maximize with respect to q(θ), the concavity of the principal's ojective function is given by BMR's arguments.
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The first order condition of the Principal's maximization problem is given by
To characterize the solution we need the expression of
. From the self-selection constraint, we have derived the expressions:
Here, we need to introduce a new assumption. We assume that over the set θ b , θ , the function q j (.) (for all j different from i) are strictly increasing. Thus, without loss of generality, we can rewrite the direct mechanism q j (θ) , T j (θ) as a direct mechanism q j (θ) ,t j q j (θ) . 8 To see that, if q j (.) is strictly increasing, we can define a inverse function θ
. The former first order condition (7) for becomes:
As we have assumed that the function q j (.) is strictly increasing, we get:
Differentiating this equation with respect to q i (θ) gives (as q i (θ) is a parameter in (7), this transformation makes sense):
By summing that conditions over j = i, we get:
As we consider a symmetric equilibrium all the principals j, (with j different from i), are offering the same mechanism, and thus the derivative t ′′ j q j θ * j is constant with j and we denote it t ′′ . Thus we get:
At equilibrium all principals offer the same mechanism (∀ j ∈ n q j (θ) = q(θ)), thus equation (25) at equilibrium can be written
Differentiating this equation with respect to θ gives
Thus at equilibrium we have,
Where denote q(.) the equilibrium value of q i (.). This expression can be simplified and written
Now, we can do the same for ∂ ∑ j =i T j θ * j /∂q i (θ). Using our new notation, we can write:
As usual we assume that the equilibrium is symmetric, then at equilibrium there is a unique value of t ′ j q θ * j denoted t ′ . Using equation (29), we get t ′ = θ − nγσ 2 q (θ).
Thus we have
where T (.) denotes the equilibrium transfer. In the same manner, this expression can be also written as
Using the two obtained expressions, from the first order condition (22) can get a equilibrium condition:
Consequently, using the notation q * (θ) =
, we get:
and finallyq
the expression derived by BMR. 9 If θ ∈ [θ, θ a ], the principal i maximizes the following expression with respect to q i (θ):
We can derive the same expression forq
Given the expressions ofq (θ), θ a and θ b must be such that the function q is continuous. As the aggregate supply nq (.) is an increasing function, the form chosen for the utility is justified. Usual conditions on the density f guaranty that q is strictly increasing. 10 Participation In order to be optimal, the proposed mechanisms must be not only incentive compatible, but they must also be individually rational: the agent must accept them. First, when his type belongs to the interval [θ a , θ b ], as principals are offering to him the degenerate mechanism (0, 0), the agent does participate. When θ belongs to [θ, θ a ] the equilibrium quantity q (θ) is negative and positive when θ belongs to θ b , θ . Thus from equations (14) and (15), it is clear that the agent prefers to participate. It is also clear that he prefers to accept all contracts than accepting only some of then. At equilibrium equations (14) and (15) become
if θgeqθ b , and
if θ ≤ θ a . The two expressions are increasing with n.
Concavity of the agent's program
In order to derive the equilibrium mechanisms, we have followed what we could call a "first order" approach. The agent's best reply is characterized by first order conditions only. To conplete, we have to justify this approach.
This can be done by using the conditions given by Stole [12] . But these conditions are only valid when there are two principals. If we assume that n = 2, our model satisfy these conditions. Stole's theorems 5 and 6 apply in our setting. If there are only two principals, the utility of the agent has the following form
Thus, the following cross-derivatives are constant: ∂ 3 U /∂q 1 ∂q 2 ∂θ = 0, ∂ 2 U /∂q 1 ∂q 2 = −γσ 2 , ∂ 2 U /∂q 1 ∂q 2 = −γσ 2 , ∂ 2 U /∂q 1 ∂θ = 0 and ∂ 2 U /∂q 2 ∂θ = 0. The functions q 1 (.) and q 2 (.) are increasing with respect to θ. Finally, the equation (9) can also be written (for i = 1, 2)
This last condition is equivalent to condition (12) in Stole [12] . Therefore, we can conclude that the mechanisms (q i (.), T i (.)) i=1,2 are, in the language of Stole [12] , commonly implementable, i.e; if he faces these two mechanisms, the agent (weakly) prefers to report his true type to each principal rather than misreporting his information.
the message θ to principal j and he gets from him the quantity q j (θ). Obviously, the three players are indifferent between the two situations. Therefore, we can see that the menus derived by BMR and the direct mechanisms derived in the present note are equivalent. It is important to notice that this is not a general feature of common agency game. There are examples in the literature (see Peters [10] and Martimort & Stole [5] ) showing that this equivalence between menus and direct mechanisms is not general at all.
Conclusion
Our result suggests four main remarks:
Direct mechanisms are not able to characterize every equilibria in a common agency game. However, they seem to be quite powerful. It would be very interesting to have a general theorem giving conditions under which an equilibrium cannot be characterized by direct mechanisms.
The BMR methodology remains interesting since we do not have a general theorem.
As we have said in the introduction, we do not have any hints on the generality of our result. An interesting extension of this work, would be to do the same computations for the other models in which menus are used to derive the equilibria.
The BMR equilibrium is the unique equilibrium with convex price schedules. This does not means that is the unique equilibrium of the BMR game. The existence of other equilibria remains an open question. If there exist other equilibria, we do not know if direct mechanisms are able to characterize them. Some equilibria of common agency games can be characterized by direct mechanisms, some that cannot be. From a technical point of view, it would be interesting to have result on their stability for example. It would be also interesting to know which kind of equilibria is more likely to be reached empirically.
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